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ABSTRACT: This article explores the use and value of surprise
attacks in modern warfare.

A

surprise attack, conceived with cunning, prepared with duplicity,
and executed with ruthlessness, provides international history
with its most melodramatic moments. A state believes itself to
be at peace then suddenly finds itself at war, in agony and embarrassed that
it failed to pick up the enemy plot and will now suffer the consequences
of blows from which recovery will be hard. Melodramas along these
lines play out not only in the worst-case scenarios of military planners
and alarmist commentators but also in movies and novels. They offer a
compelling narrative: the most powerful states are humiliated and the
course of history altered as one power sees possibilities for action that its
victim misses completely. It is also a credible narrative as surprise attacks
have been regular occurrences throughout history. They make military
sense as defeating a strong opponent is always going to be difficult unless
the first blows really count. Maximizing operational secrecy is essential to
maximizing operational success.
Surprise makes the most sense when battles are decisive. Otherwise,
the effect will be to start a war—with all the pain, risk, and uncertainty—
without ensuring victory. A decisive victory forces the enemy hand. An
important legacy of the Napoleonic Wars was the conviction that such
a victory depended on the effective elimination of the enemy army.
At some point surprise could make the critical difference when two
essentially symmetrical armies, relying on superior tactics, organization
and armaments, faced each other. Catching an unprepared enemy with
an early blow from which it could never really recover, even if it tried to
fight on, should allow the whole business of war to be concluded quickly.
The Franco-Prussian War underscored the importance of early
battlefield success. The Prussians were astonished when the French,
having declared war, were slow to mobilize. They did not make the same
mistake. The efficiency of their mobilization, along with the innovative
tactics of Helmuth von Moltke, caught France unaware, leading to its
defeat at the Battle of Sedan at the start of September 1870. Germany
executed the ideal campaign, quick and truly decisive, spoiled only by
the refusal of the French population to accept the verdict of battle until
their unexpected resistance was crushed. Moltke showed how to surprise
the enemy, and his successors in the German general staff took note: To
win a war, mobilize early and strike hard and fast.
The German victory also led to speculation about how other
powers might be caught out by a ruthless and resourceful enemy,
including books imagining how other great powers might also suffer
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sudden and catastrophic defeats. An early example of this genre was The
Battle of Dorking, written by a British Army officer. Appearing in 1871
just after von Moltke’s victory, Dorking described a German invasion
from across the channel in which telegraph cables were cut to prevent
advance warning. The Royal Navy, which had allowed itself to become
overextended because of colonial commitments, lost its warships to “fatal
engines which sent our ships, one after the other, to the bottom.” The
drama concluded with a last stand on a ridge near Dorking in southern
England, where a brave combination of regulars and reserves were let
down by the army’s miserable organization. And so, the accumulated
prosperity and strength of centuries was lost in days. A once-proud
nation was stripped of its colonies, “its trade gone, its factories silent, its
harbours empty, a prey to pauperism and decay.”1
As with so much writing about the future of war, this example
essentially made a point about the present, in this case the need for
army reform, a statement about what might happen if sensible measures
were not taken urgently. Other books followed with similar themes
about the dangers of spies or readying young men for the demands
and sacrifices of war, or sometimes in counternarratives to the gloom,
demonstrating how a brave nation could cope with all challenges. By
the start of the twentieth century, writers were exploring the military
possibilities opening up with new technologies such as heavier-than-air
flying machines.2 The imagination of the British novelist H. G. Wells
even stretched to atom bombs.3 A regular theme in all this literature
was the importance of surprise and the first blow. The key to victory
was seizing the initiative.
There were those, such as the Polish banker Ivan Bloch, who
understood that even the cleverest plans might fail, that defenses
might cope better than expected with dashing attacks, and that a
defiant population might resist foreign occupation.4 Still, the Germans
opened the First World War with an ambitious offensive designed, once
again, to defeat France quickly. But this time they failed. Instead of a
decisive victory, they got caught up in a long attritional slog, in which
they struggled to cope with the superior economic and demographic
strengths of their enemies.
After 1918, alternative routes to a quick victory were sought. One
possibility was to use tanks to wage a rapid offensive. But there was
another alternative that dispensed with forcing an enemy land invasion.
Instead of pressuring the enemy government to capitulate as a result of
the annihilation of its army, it would have to surrender because of the
demands of a desperate population unable to cope with a succession
of massive air raids and being hit by high explosives, incendiaries, and
poison gas. A new dystopian literature quickly developed, telling of
the trials of ordinary people as they fled their burning cities or of the
hopelessness of governments in the face of weapons they were unable
1      George Chesney, “The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer,” Blackwood’s Magazine
(May 1871), http:// gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0602091h.html.
2      See the two novels about Robur, with his heavier-than-air flying machine, by Jules Verne, The
Clipper of the Clouds (London: Sampson Low, 1887); and Jules Verne, Master of the World (London:
Sampson Low, 1904).
3      H. G. Wells, The World Set Free, a Story of Mankind (London: Macmillan, 1914).
4      Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? Being an Abridgment of the War of the Future in
Its Technical Economic and Political Relations (London: Grant Richard, 1899).
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to counter. The theme comes through in some of the titles: The Poison
War, The Black Death, Menace, Empty Victory, Invasion from the Air, War upon
Women, Chaos, and Air Reprisal.5
Air raids did not provide the opening shots of the Second World
War, but they soon came. becoming regular and progressively more
destructive. Although their effects were certainly terrible, they were not
decisive.6 The resilience of ordinary people and of modern societies had
been underestimated. Only with the war’s finale and the atom bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the deadly promise of air
power realized. Previous air raids had killed as many people, but this
time the devastation required only single weapons and the impact was
emphasized by the surrender of an already beleaguered Japan.
The prospect that the next war could soon “go nuclear” inevitably
dominated strategic debates after 1945. But, the trauma of the two surprise
attacks that brought the Soviet Union and then the United States into
the Second World War shaped considerations of what that might mean.
Pushing the logic of seizing the initiative to the extreme, Hitler launched
Operation Barbarossa against Russia in June 1941 while the British were
still fighting; the Japanese attacked the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
despite failing to pacify China. Both efforts were enormous gambles,
bold in their execution and complete in their surprise. Both offensives
were characterized by arrogance, for their leaders were convinced their
nations were superior in spirit and in discipline, but also in recklessness,
taking on much larger powers before defeating the existing enemies.
Both gambles failed. The Soviet Union was rocked; at one point it
looked like it would succumb, but it held on. Gradually, the size of the
country, its harsh climate, reserves of strength, and Nazi mistakes turned
the tide of war.7 There was never much chance that Japan would conquer
the United States—the objective was to get in the best position for what
was assumed to be an inevitable war. The result was a terrible conflict
with great suffering, ending with Japan under American occupation.8
The most important lesson was that getting in the first blow,
however well designed and executed, did not guarantee victory. Yet for
the victims of 1941, the basic lesson was that great power did not provide
immunity from surprise attack. The United States and the Soviet Union
won in the end, but their fights were long and painful, and the results
were not preordained. The shock effect was substantial, and it left a
legacy in the way both thought about war thereafter. In 1958, when
experts from both superpowers met briefly to discuss their fears of
surprise attacks, the Soviets were fixated on yet another large offensive
set in motion by Germany, this time backed by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), while the Americans were focused on another
Pearl Harbor-type “bolt from the blue” this time with nuclear missiles.9
5      I. F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1763–3749 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), 169–70.
6      Richard J. Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013).
7      Christian Hartmann, Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Germany’s War in the East, 1941–1945 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
8      Jeffrey Record, A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941
(Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2011).
9      Jeremi Suri, “America’s Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise
Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for ‘Eisenhower Revisionists’,” Diplomatic History 21,
no. 3 (Summer 1997).
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The impact of these shocks could be seen during the Cold War,
especially in regard to nuclear strategy. In Washington the dominant
fear was that Soviet leadership might become convinced that a wellcrafted first strike would put it in a position where it need not fear
retaliation. Starting numbers were irrelevant if the United States could
be disarmed by a surprise Soviet attack directed against its bombers,
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and missile-carrying submarines.10
In the 1960s, the Pentagon set a test for the US nuclear arsenal: could
it “assure destruction” of the Soviet Union? In other words, could
America maintain “at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict
an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination
of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise first strike.” This damage
was quantified at 33–20 percent of the Soviet population and 75–50
percent of the Soviet industrial capacity. These criteria assumed a pain
threshold well above the losses experienced in World War II, which
were hardly willingly accepted. Then, the highest possible intelligence
assessments about future Soviet capabilities were considered to see
whether any extra capabilities were required to ensure that the assured
destruction criteria could be met. The answer was not a lot was needed
beyond existing plans.
This effort was not a prediction of the course of a future war, or of
the American government’s reaction to a complete failure of deterrence.
The aim was to leave no doubt in the minds of Soviet leadership that
aggression carried an unavoidable risk of nuclear devastation. An
American response could not be guaranteed because the Soviet Union
could also, even after absorbing a first strike, ensure similar levels of
destruction of the United States. Hence “mutual assured destruction,”
naturally known as MAD, came to describe the standoff between the
nuclear powers during the Cold War. How much the capability contributed
to preventing a hot war remains a matter for conjecture. There were
many reasons why political leaders would have been desperate to avoid
a Third World War, but the possibility of mutual destruction was hardly
irrelevant. It was not necessary to gaze for long into a crystal ball to
see the awful devastation with which a future war might end.11 Would
the Germans and Japanese in 1941 have really been so ready to launch
their wars if their crystal balls had shown them how bad things might
turn out? The point of deterrence was to persuade a potential adversary
not to bank on the first move being decisive, and to think through the
consequences of an enemy still capable of fighting back.
Establishing there was no sure way to win a nuclear war did not end
all fears. The Soviet Union kept building up its own arsenal, suggesting
it had a different view of how deterrence might work, which might even
include some plan for a nuclear victory. Even if MAD meant the nuclear
arsenals neutralized each other, the Soviet strength in conventional
capabilities provided them with other options for mischief. This capacity
left plenty of scope for inventiveness when it came to imagining how
Moscow might take an initiative that would catch Washington unaware
and so allow stealing some geopolitical advantage. One scenario actively
debated in the 1970s was the possibility of a sudden and vast Warsaw
10      Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959).
11      Albert Carnesale et al., Living with Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1983).
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Pact offensive into West Germany that required little prior mobilization,
and so, no practical warning to NATO about the attack.12 This worstcase scenario assumed everything worked perfectly for the enemy while
NATO was left flat-footed, overwhelmed before it could even consider
escalation to nuclear force.
Yet, even when contemporary wars have opened with surprise
attacks, the results have not been encouraging. Israel’s demolition of
Egypt’s air force on the first day of the Six-Day War (1967) is one example
where the enemy was left helpless by a well-executed attack. Although,
this war also demonstrates how conquering and occupying another’s
territory might also lead to persistent terrorism and insurgency. Two
prime examples of surprise attacks that failed to deliver early victories
are North Korea’s move against South Korea in 1950 and Iraq’s contest
with Iran three decades later. The North might have succeeded if an
international coalition had not managed to aid South Korea before it
was completely overrun. Iraq found itself struggling to cope with Iran’s
counterinvasion in 1980 and became caught in a war lasting until 1988.
Its resultant indebtedness to those who helped it fund its defense, was
one reason for its next surprise attack—Kuwait in August 1990. The
occupation was easily accomplished, but it barely lasted six months.
Kuwait was liberated under an American-led coalition in early 1991.
The most striking feature of modern wars is not how quickly they
can be concluded but how long they last.13 The United States achieved
quick victories in Iraq and Afghanistan against regular forces but then
got bogged down dealing with insurgencies. Russian aggression against
Ukraine has left it bogged down in an inconclusive struggle. Syria
has become an arena in which a whole series of regional conflicts are
playinged out without an identified route to anything resembling peace
being identified. With civil wars, the typical conflict now lasts years,
long after the economy, society, and political system have been broken,
with the violence sustained by criminals as well as zealots, warlords, and
neighboring states.
Major powers now often appear tentative and unsure. Even when,
as with Russia, they seem to be taking bold steps, their objectives turn
out to be limited. Grand victories are no longer in mind. Instead of
audacious moves geared to a quick victory, a probing, patient alternative
approach is even seen in China’s disputes in the South China Sea.
Yet, none of this has erased concerns about surprise attacks. One
reason is the recollection of al-Qaeda’s attacks on New York and
Washington on September 11, 2001, after which commentary soon
turned again to Pearl Harbor. The lesson lay not in the revenge taken
against al-Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan but the shock
of discovering the vulnerability of modern, open societies too malicious
attack. The aim seemed simply to cause maximum pain, and that goal
soon led to speculation about the many ways that pain might be inflicted.
12      A “standing start” attack was a theme in an influential report by Senators Sam Nunn and
Dewey F. Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat, US Senate, Armed Services Committee, 95th
Congress, First Session (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977). See also Robert
Close, Europe without Defence? 48 Hours that Could Change the Face of the World (Brussels: Editions Arts
and Voyages, 1976).
13      Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation
of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
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Scenarios in which small terrorist cells or even “lone wolves” could
cause harm using basic weapons such as guns, knives, highly explosive
materials, aircraft or motor vehicles turned into lethal weapons were
constructed. Attacks of this sort could not bring a modern western state
to “its knees.”14 The surprise they achieved was essentially tactical in its
effects. At most, strategically they were part of an ongoing and largely
uncoordinated global insurgency. Despite the obvious differences in
scale and impact, the outcome of a Taliban ambush in Kabul or of a
shooting in Paris were part of a campaign that began before 9/11 and
appears to be of indefinite duration.
All of this needs to be kept in mind when addressing claims that
future surprise attacks will come out of cyberspace and have effects
tantamount to defeat in war. As early as the 1990s, the growing
dependence of vital services on digital networks led to warnings of an
“electronic Pearl Harbor” directed against the critical infrastructure
supporting energy, transport, banking, and so on.15 Instead of trying to
get quick victories by taking out enemy forces, why not instead take out
the enemy society? While the technical issues are quite different from
more classical forms of military attack, and the practice would be far
less violent, there are similarities to the post-1918 claims about strategic
air bombardment providing a more satisfactory route to victory than
attritional fights between armies.16 As with a nuclear first strike, the
best case for the perpetrator requires confidence that preparations for
an attack are not detected, that the appropriate networks are properly
identified and could be attacked, and that the cyberattacks will work as
planned. And then, as with Operation Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor,
there is the question of what happens after the first blow. How would
this turn into a lasting political gain? A cyberattack does not lead to
territory being occupied. The victims would be expected to respond,
even as they struggled to get the lights back on and systems working.
An attack that produced drastic effects could be considered a casus belli,
and classical military responses might be considered legitimate.17
The issue is not whether critical infrastructure can be vulnerable and
lead to major upset if taken down. Hostile activity in the cyberdomain,
represented by a continuing offense-defense duel, is now constant and
ubiquitous. It involves activists, terrorist and criminal organizations and
poses constant trouble for those trying to preserve the integrity and the
effectiveness of vital networks. The danger, however, is not so much of
some one-off catastrophic surprise attack but a series of events in line
with modern conflict, reflecting the blurring of the military and civilian
spheres, efforts to weaken and subvert opponents without attacking
them head on. These are wars with occasional military strikes and
battles, often vicious but still short of being truly decisive. Cyberattacks

14      The most alarming prospect was a terrorist nuclear weapon. Graham Allison, Nuclear
Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books / Henry Holt, 2004).
15      The first to refer to the possibility of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” was Winn Schwartau,
Terminal Compromise (Old Hickory, TN: Interpact Press, 1991), http://www.gutenberg.org
/files/79/79.txt.
16      See John Arquilla, “The Computer Mouse that Roared: Cyberwar in the Twenty-First
Century,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 18, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2011): 39–48.
17      George Lucas, Ethics and Cyber Warfare: The Quest for Responsible Security in the Age of Digital
Warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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represent another way to cause injury and irritation short of obvious
acts of war, as well as serving as natural accompaniments to acts of war.
There is, therefore, a disconnect between the continuing search
for a route to a decisive victory and the contemporary experience of
warfare, which once started, is hard to stop. Even if enemy regulars are
overwhelmed, the result is as likely to be insurgency, especially directed
against foreign forces. This tends to be reflected in more recent future
war fiction, such as Ghost Fleet by Peter Singer and August Cole. This
story opens with a surprise attack of impressive complexity, cunning and
duplicity, which almost succeeds but fails in the end.18
There will always be arguments for testing the resilience of systems
against the worst case. If they can cope with the most severe threats
then lesser cases should be manageable. The worst case may depend
on the aggressor being foolish and futile, but stupidity is one of the
hardest things for any intelligence agency to predict. At the same time,
when planning an offensive, every effort must be made to make the first
blows count. The key point, however, is that even with surprise and
maximum effort, these first blows are unlikely to be decisive on their
own, especially against an opponent with any reserves of strength. This
depth is why states must look beyond surprise attacks to what follows,
to the second and third blows, and also to those much further down the
line, perhaps delivered by irregulars who have taken over the struggle
after the defeat of the regulars. The surprises of war do not just come
at the start.

18      P. W. Singer and August Cole, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 2015).

